This paper exploits plausibly exogenous changes in family size caused by relaxations in China's One Child Policy to estimate the effect of family size on school enrollment of the first child. The results show that for one-child families, an additional child significantly increased school enrollment of firstborn children. The analysis provides suggestive evidence that economies of scale in child rearing and short-term income demands contribute to the main results.
Introduction
The effect of family size on child quality is a question of longstanding interest for economists. The effect is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, a large literature in economics provides evidence that parents trade off the quantity of children with the quality of children, which implies that the quality of children declines as family size increases (e.g., Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and Tomes, 1976) . 1 On the other hand, child psychologists such as Iacovou (2001) and Zajonc (1982) emphasize social interaction and learning-by-doing. They argue that increases in the number of children can increase the quality of children because it provides children opportunities to teach and learn from each other. 2 Alternatively, there may simply be economies of scale in costs for childcare for items such as clothes and textbooks such that an additional child lowers the marginal cost of quality for all children. In the rural Chinese context, this can be seen in Table 1A , which shows that average per child expenditures on household chores and child care for rural Chinese households decrease significantly with the number of children.
For policy makers in developing countries today, understanding this relationship is especially relevant as many governments have attempted to curb population growth as a way of increasing average human capital investment. Both China and India, the world's two most populous countries, have experimented with different family planning policies to limit family size. This study addresses the effect of family 1 The textbook quantity-quality tradeoff argues that as women's wages rise, the cost of having children increases, and hence, parents will have fewer children. These models assume that parents equalize investment across children. Thus, reducing the number of children will naturally increase the average quality of children. The classic quality-quality model does not allow for differences across children.
2 Iacovou (2001), a child psychologist, argues that the disadvantage could be because children benefit from social interactions with other children. Using detailed data on time use of children in the U.K., she finds that the one-child disadvantage decreases with the amount of time a child spends playing with other children after school. In the learning-by-doing discussed in Zajonc (1982) , older children are predicted to benefit more from having additional siblings than the youngest child because it is assumed that children teach younger children and benefit especially from teaching.
size by examining the effect of increasing household size from one to two on school enrollment in rural China. To establish causality, I exploit region and birth year variation in relaxations of the One Child Policy.
There are two main difficulties. First, there is the possibility of parental heterogeneity. For example, if parents who value education more also prefer to have fewer children, then the correlation between quantity and quality will over-estimate potentially negative effects of family size. Endogeneity may also arise from the quality of the first child. For example, if parents are more likely to have a second child when the first child is of high quality, the correlational evidence will under-estimate the potentially negative effects of family size. To address these issues, past studies have carefully constructed strategies that exploit the exogenous variation in family size caused by multiple births or the sex composition of the first two children ( 3 While previous works provide important evidence, the strategies they employ cannot be applied to all contexts.
Specifically, the estimates from using the sibling-sex composition instrument is most suitable for studying the effect of increasing the number of children from two to three, and cannot be an excludable instrument if parents practice sex-selection. Estimates from using the twins instrument can lack external validity to non-twin children.
The principal contribution of this paper is to address these problems and estimate the effect of increasing the number of children from one to two. I exploit regional and time variation in the relaxations of China's One Child Policy (OCP). 3 The sibling sex composition methodology argues that parents prefer children of mixed sex. Therefore, they are more likely to have a third child if the first two are of the same sex. The twins methodology argues that the occurrence of twins (before the introduction of fertility treatments) is uncorrelated to individual characteristics. Hence, twinning is a plausibly exogenous source of variation for family size. Both methodologies examine the effect of an additional sibling for families with at least two children. Schlepper (2005, 2006) used both techniques and found that the results are similar.
I use the relaxation that allowed families to have a second child if the first child is a girl to instrument for the family size of first-parity children born before the relaxation was announced. Three facts are exploited: first, an individual is only affected by the relaxation if she is born in a relaxed area; second, amongst first-born children born in relaxed areas, only girls are affected; and third, a girl is more likely to gain a sibling due to the relaxation if she is younger at the time of the policy announcement. The instrument for family size is the triple interaction term of an individual's sex, date of birth and region of birth. The interaction between whether a girl was born in a relaxed area and her birth year estimates the effect of the relaxation on family size. The additional comparison with boys controls for region-specific changes in school provision (and other cohort changes) that affected boys and girls similarly. This strategy differs from previous methods in that it essentially compares one-child households with two-child households. Interpreting the 2SLS estimates as causal assumes that absent the introduction of the relaxation, the difference between households with first-born daughters and those with sons would have moved along parallel trends for villages that received the relaxation and villages that did not. This is the standard parallel trends assumption applied to a triple difference setting. I do not take this assumption as given and will carefully consider and provide evidence against potential caveats in the robustness section.
The OLS estimates show that for households with three or fewer children, the number of siblings is negatively correlated with school enrollment. However, for households with two or fewer children, having a younger sibling is positively correlated with the school enrollment of the eldest child. This is consistent with the descriptive evidence which shows that only children are, on average, less likely to be enrolled in school relative to children from two-child families, who are, on average, more likely to be enrolled in school relative to children from three child families.
The 2SLS results show that for households with two or fewer children, an additional child significantly increases the school enrollment of the first child by up to sixteen percentage points. The fact that the 2SLS estimate is larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate is consistent with the existence of parental heterogeneity in preferences for education and quality.
The main results show that there is a significant one-child disadvantage for the eldest child, which is consistent with the belief that children benefit from teaching younger siblings, and also with the possibility that there may be economies of scale in raising children. They do not unambiguously reject the Beckerian quantity-quality tradeoff model since that model makes predictions about the average outcomes of children, and I can only examine the outcomes for the eldest child. However, for quantity to have no average effect on quality given my findings for the eldest child, there would have to be inequality across children, which would also be inconsistent with a simple Beckerian case.
In addition to the main results, we attempt to investigate the mechanisms underlying them. First, I investigate the hypothesis that the positive effect of an additional child is driven by economies of scale in child rearing costs. Under the assumption that there are larger economies of scale school for children of the same sex (e.g., children can more easily share clothes if they are the same sex), I explore this hypothesis by examining whether the benefit of the second child is larger when the two children are the same sex. The results show that the benefits of a second child are almost entirely driven by households where the two children are of the same sex. This is consistent with the presence of economies of scale.
Second, I examine the hypothesis that the benefit of an additional child is driven by an increase in permanent income. For example, if adult children provide parents with income, then an additional child will increase the permanent income of the household. If parents can borrow against their children's future income, this could increase investment in schooling. Under the assumption that parents expect sons to earn more than daughters, I test this hypothesis by investigating if the benefits of a second child are larger when the second child is a boy. The results show the opposite pattern: the benefits are larger when the second child is a girl. Therefore, our results do not seem to be driven by increases in permanent income, which is perhaps not surprising since households in rural China are generally believed to be credit constrained. Note that because the sex of the second child is not random due to sex selection, these results should be interpreted very cautiously as only suggestive evidence.
Finally, I investigate the possibility that the main results occur due to binding income constraints. If the financial costs imposed by an additional child outweighs schooling costs, then parents pay increase their labor supply in the labor market and substitute public schools for self-provided child care. The data limits the extent to which I can investigate this hypothesis. I examine the effect of an additional child on mother's labor supply and school delay. The results are suggestive, but imprecisely estimated. They suggest that an additional child causes mothers to be more likely to enter the labor force and causes the elder child to enter school at younger ages. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that income demand caused by the additional child causes mothers to work and the first child into school. Interestingly, they suggest the possibility that public schools are being used as a form of low-cost childcare. This is important because it implies that classic frameworks for understanding the relationship between family size and children's schooling may be inadequate for contexts where schooling costs are low and can be used as a form of subsidized childcare by parents.
This study makes several contributions. First, it adds to the existing literature on the effects of family size. The results from this literature has been mixed. 4 Most of theses studies have focused on the effect of additional children conditional on there already being two children. I add to these studies by being the first to provide evidence for the one-child disadvantage (at least for the eldest child), which suggests that the effect of family size may be non-monotonic across family size. The finding that additional children benefit the schooling outcomes of the eldest child is similar to Angrist et. al.'s (2010) finding for Israel. The implication that the effects of family size may differ across birth orders supports the findings of Black et al. (2006) for Norway.
Second, this study provides an evaluation of the effects of the OCP, one of the most restrictive and large scale family planning policies ever undertaken. While demographers and sociologists have conducted many descriptive studies of the policy's impact on fertility and sex ratios, the lack of local enforcement data has heretofore prevented an examination of the causal effect of the OCP on child outcomes. The findings indicate that the OCP decreased female survival by up to ten percentagepoints, and the relaxation was successful in reducing the sex selection to pre-OCP levels. Interestingly, the results also show that the previous rule on four-year birth spacing was well enforced, a fact that has received little attention from policy debates or academic studies. In rigorously evaluating the effects of the OCP, the first stage of this paper is closely related to a recent study by Ebenstein (2010) , which uses Chinese Census data to show that regional sex ratios are closely linked to the level 4 On the one hand, studies have found family size to have no effect or even a positive effect on child outcomes in Israel Schlepper, 2005, 2006) , Korea (Lee, 2003) , the U.S. (Kessler, 1993) , China (Guo and VanWey, 1991) and Africa (Gomes, 1984) . On the other hand, the effect of family size on education has been found to be negative in the India (Rosenzweig and Woolen, 1980) , France (Goux and Maurin, 2004) , the U.S. (Conley, 2004; Berhman et. al., 1989; and Stafford, 1987) , and China (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses family planning policies and education in rural China. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
Background

Family Planning Policies
In the 1970s, after two decades of explicitly encouraging population growth, policy makers in China enacted a series of measures to curb population growth. The policies applied to individuals of Han ethnicity, who make up 92% of China's population. of their children at least four years apart. The One Child Policy was formally announced in 1979. Actual implementation began in certain regions as early as 1978, and enforcement gradually tightened across the country until it was firmly in place in 1980 (Croll et. al., 1985; Banister, 1987) . 6 Second births became forbidden except under extenuating circumstances. Local cadres were given economic incentives to suppress fertility rates. In the early 1980s, parts of the country were swept by campaigns of forced abortion and sterilization and reports of female infanticide became widespread (Greenlaugh, 1986; Banister, 1987) .
Local governments began issuing permits for a second child as early as 1982.
However, permits for a second child were not made widespread until the Central Party Committee issued "Document 7" on April 13, 1984. The two main purposes of the document were to: 1) curb female infanticide, forced abortion and forced sterilization; and 2) devolve responsibility from the central government to the local and provincial government so that local conditions could be better addressed. In other words, it allowed for regional variation in family planning polices. The document allowed for second births for rural couples with "practical" difficulties, and strictly prohibited coercive methods. 7 The main relaxation following Document No. 7 is called the "1-son-2-child" rule. It allowed rural couples to have a second child if the first child was a girl (Greenlaugh, 1986) . The explicit purpose of this relaxation was to decrease female infanticide of the first-born child. White (1992) found that 5% of rural households were allotted second child permits in 1982. These permits were generally granted to regions with extremely high levels of infanticide. After Document 7, the permits expanded to 10% of the rural 6 Past studies generally consider the One Child Policy to have only affected the family size of cohorts born after 1979/80. However, this paper will show that because of the previous four year birth spacing rule, the One Child Policy affected cohorts born in 1976 and after.
7 Practical difficulties included households where a parent or first-born child was handicapped, or if a parent was engaged in a dangerous industry (e.g., mining).
population in 1984, 20% in 1985 and 50% by 1986. Document No. 7 made provincial governments responsible for both maintaining low fertility rates and decreasing infanticide. While the exact process of granting permits is unclear, I use county level data on family planning policy to show in the next section that the probability for a county to obtain the 1-son-2-child relaxation is positively correlated with the rate of pre-relaxation sex-selection, and both are positively correlated with distance from the provincial capital. These facts most likely reflect that in order to maintain low aggregate fertility rates and decrease excess female mortality (EFM), provincial governments granted relaxations to regions that were distant from the administrative capital and where EFM was more prevalent. The higher prevalence of sex-selection in rural areas can be due to both more boy-preference in distant rural areas and the fact that geographic distance increases the provincial government's logistical difficulty of preventing EFM. 8 Issues of identification that arise from the correlation of obtaining a relaxation and sex-selection will be addressed explicitly in the section on robustness.
Rural Education
Rural primary schools are exclusively provided by the state in the period of this study. Relative to other developing countries, the cost of schools were very low.
Nevertheless, during the time period of this study, there was much inequality in provision across regions -both across provinces and across counties within a province.
This was a result in fiscal reforms that occured during early 1980s. The fiscal system reduced subsidies from rich regions to poor regions. The system of "eating from separate pots" (fen zao chi fan) devolved expenditure responsibilities from the central and provincial governments onto local governments in order to give the latter stronger incentives to generate revenue. The ratio of the per capita schooling expenditure in the highest spending province to the lowest spending province doubled in one decade.
Many rural schools were closed; rural enrollment rates dropped dramatically and did not recover until the mid to late 1990s (Hannum and Park, mimeo). Using spending data from Gansu province, they found that per capita school expenditure was positively correlated with income and that significant variation in school quality existed across counties. They found little variation within counties, suggesting that studies examining education outcomes should focus on variation at the county level.
Hannum (1992) showed that the difference in school provision between rich and poor areas was much greater for middle schools and high schools than for primary schools. This is consistent with the CHNS data used in this study, where primary school enrollment remained stable while middle school and high school dropout rates increased for poor areas (Hannum and Park, mimeo).
The CHNS data show that counties with some relaxation and counties with no relaxation had similar geographic access to schooling in 1989. However, the data does not reveal quality of schooling or the changes in school availability during the early 1980s. Because relaxed areas tend to be more rural, it is likely that the quality of schools declined in relaxed areas during the same time that the 1-son-2-child relaxation took effect. To control for this, I will compare outcomes for girls to boys within counties. The strategy is robust as long as the changes in school quality and the economic conditions that determine school quality in relaxed areas have the same impact on both boys and girls. have chosen to keep girls in order to have a second child so that the 2SLS estimate without excluding those born after 1981 will be biased by parental preferences and show that girls with larger family sizes are better off. Panels A and B in Table 1B show that amongst first-born children, girls, on average, have more siblings, more educated parents and higher school enrollment. Panels C and D show that only children are more likely to be male, have more educated parents and are more likely to be enrolled in school. This is consistent with the identification concern that parents with more education may prefer to have fewer children and value education more.
To use individuals in counties without relaxations as a control group for individuals in counties with relaxations, I would like the two groups to have similar characteristics in every respect other than the relaxation. Table 1C compares One potential concern with Chinese data on children is the fear that parents will misreport the number of children in order to evade the One Child Policy. Past studies have compared hospital birth records and population census data to show that misreporting is typically a problem for children under two years old and the data for older children are typically accurate (Zeng et. al., 1993) . Since I use data from 1990 to study children born close before and after 1976 (who were around fourteen years old by the time the data was collected), misreporting should not affect my study. This reflects both the fact that parents of young children may not have finished having children and a decrease in family size over time. To reveal the commonly seen OLS evidence for the quantity-quality trade-off, I regress a dummy variable for school enrollment on dummy variables for the number of children in a household.
Empirical Strategy
Children from one-child households are the reference group. Figure 2A plots the coefficients. It shows that family size is negatively correlated with school enrollment regardless of whether county fixed effects are controlled for. However, this confounds the family size effect with several factors: 1) younger children are more likely to be in school; 2) younger children will have fewer siblings because their parents may not have finished having children; and 3) quantity and quality may be jointly determined by parental preferences. Controlling for birth years addresses the first two problems and causes the relationship between family size and school enrollment to become non-monotonic. Figure 2B plots the coefficients for family size when controlling for birth year fixed effects. 10 Relative to the reference group of children from one-child families, children from two-child families have higher school enrollment. However, the correlation between enrollment and family size is negative for households with two to five children.
The main second stage equation will control for birth county and birth year fixed effects. It can be written as the following.
School enrollment for individual i, born in county c, birth year t, is a function of: sibs itc , the number of siblings he or she has; X ict , individual characteristics; the interaction term between urban c , distance to urban area, and d l , a variable indicating whether an individual was born in year l; γ t , birth year fixed effects; and ψ c , county fixed effects.
This faces the problem that the number of children and investment in these children are jointly determined by parents. Hence, if parents who value education also prefer smaller households, then OLS will over-estimate the negative effect of an additional sibling on schooling. I address this by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in family size caused by relaxations in the One Child Policy. Sex, date and region of birth jointly determine an individual's exposure to the 1-son-2-child relaxation. The relaxation allowed parents to have a second child only if the firstborn child was a girl. Therefore, family size should be positively correlated with being a girl. Since parents are more likely to have a second child if the first girl was younger when the relaxation was announced, family size should be negatively 10 Estimates for the coefficients plotted in Figures 2A and 2B are shown in Appendix Table A1 .
correlated with the age of the first girl. The interaction between whether a girl was born in a relaxed area and her age estimates the effect of the relaxation on family size. The additional comparison with boys controls for changes in policies such as education provision that affected both boys and girls similarly. The instrument for family size is therefore the triple interaction of an individual's sex, year of birth and region of birth. Only the combination of the three is exogenous. The exclusion restriction for the instrument is that it must be correlated with family size and only affect school enrollment via the family size channel.
To understand the identification strategy, I first estimate the effect of the policy on family size for boys and girls separately. If the policy was fully enforced, it should increase the number of siblings for first-born girls for whom the One Child Policy prevented from having younger siblings. The relaxation should have no effect on the family size of boys. I estimate the following equation separately for samples of first born boys and girls born during 1962-1981.
The number of siblings for individual i, born in county c, birth year t, is a function of: the interaction term of relax c , the extent of relaxation in county c and d il , a dummy indicating whether the individual was born in year l; γ t , birth year fixed effects and ψ c , county fixed effects. The reference group is comprised of individuals born during 1962-1972. It and all of its interaction terms are dropped.
For all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the county level.
Then, to assess the statistical difference of the effect on boys and girls, I pool the data to estimate the first stage equation with the triple interaction terms on the right hand side.
The number of siblings for individual i, born in county c, birth year t, is a function of: the triple interaction term of relax c , the extent of relaxation in county c, girl itc , a variable indicating whether a child is a girl and d il , a dummy variable indicating whether the individual was born in year l; the interaction term of relax c and d il ; the interaction term between girl itc , and d il ; the interaction term between relax c and girl itc ; girl itc ; γ t , birth year fixed effects; and ψ c , county fixed effects.
As before, the reference group of cohorts born 1962-1972 and all its interactions are dropped. β l is the difference in the effect of being born in a relaxed area on family size between girls and boys born in year l. The estimates should be zero for earlier cohorts who were not affected by the One Child Policy and relaxation and positive for later affected cohorts. β l is the effect of being born in a relaxed county on family size for an individual born in year l.
Like simple differences-in-differences estimators, cohort-invariant differences across 11 For example, Qian (2008) finds that increasing relative adult male wages increases sex selection and that increasing relative adult male wages decrease girls' schooling relative to boys. This would cause a downward bias in the 2SLS estimates.
The CHNS does not have accurate data on individual income within the household since much of rural production is conducted at the household level and income cannot be accurately assigned to individual members. Consequently, I cannot directly examine the role of relative earnings in this study.
The probability of being male for individual i, born in county c, birth year t is a function of: the interaction terms between relax c , and birth year dummy variables, d il ; birth county fixed effects, ψ c ; and birth year fixed effects, γ t . β l is the correlation between being born in a relaxed county and the sex ratios of your cohort for each birth year l.
Then, to estimate the magnitude of the effect of the relaxation on sex ratios, I
estimate the following equation using the sample of first-born children.
The probability of being male for individual i, born in county c, birth year t is a function of: the interaction term between relax c , and post il , a variable indicating the individual's cohort group; ψ c , county fixed effects and γ t , cohort group fixed effect.
In the section on robustness, I will use the estimate of δ l to compute bounds for the main results. The children are divided into three groups according to birth cohort.
The reference group is comprised of individuals not affected by the One Child policy and the relaxation (born before 1978). The second group is comprised of children born after the One Child Policy but before the relaxation (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) . The third group is comprised of children born after the relaxation (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) ).δ l is the effect of the One Child Policy on sex selection in relaxed areas relative to areas without the relaxation. For robustness, I use it to calculate the extent to which the main results can be driven by selection under certain assumptions.
Empirical Results
The Correlation between Family Size and Schooling
Panels A and B of Table 2 show the estimates from equation (1 sample where all controls are available for all observations. These results are not reported for brevity and are available upon request.
The Effect of the 1-Son-2-Child Relaxation on Family Size
I first estimate equation (2) on separate samples for boys and girls. The estimates are shown in Table 3 , columns (1) and (2). The estimates for girls are statistically significant at the 1% level for individuals born 1976 and later. This is consistent with the fact that before the One Child Policy was introduced in 1979/1980, there was a four-year birth spacing law. Hence, the One Child Policy was binding for cohorts born four years previous to its introduction. The estimates for boys are statistically insignificant. The coefficients are plotted in Figure 3A . It shows that family size for boys and girls were similar for cohorts born 1973-1976, after which the family size for girls increased and the family size for boys remained the same.
The estimated coefficients for the triple interaction terms from equation (3) are shown in Table 3 , column (5). They are statistically significant at the 5% level 
The Effect of the 1-Son-2-Child Relaxation on Enrollment
I first estimate the effect of the relaxation on enrollment separately for boys and girls using an equation identical to equation (2) Table 3 , columns (3) and (4). The estimates are statistically significant for girls. Figure 4A plots the estimates for boys and girls. The plot of the reduced form shows that girls affected by the relaxation (born 1976 and after) had higher education enrollment than boys, whereas girls unaffected by the relaxation (born before 1976) had lower school enrollment rates than boys.
The estimates in Figure 4A show that, relative to areas without the relaxation, enrollment for both boys and girls decreased after primary school. This is consistent with the hypothesis that school provision and quality in relaxed regions relative to regions without the relaxation declined during this period. I control for this by comparing the effect of the relaxation on enrollment for boys with the effect of the relaxation on enrollment for girls. I estimate an equation similar to equation (3) Table 3 , column (6).
The estimates show that for older cohorts not affected by the relaxation, individuals born in relaxed areas had on average 1% to 17% less school enrollment than areas without the relaxation. However, for cohorts affected by the relaxation, individuals born in relaxed areas were on average enrolled in school 5% more than individuals born in areas without the relaxation. The estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. Figure 4B plots the triple difference reduced form estimates. It shows that school enrollment in relaxed areas was higher for girls of the affected cohort than for boys. Note that the year-by-year first stage and reduced form estimates use the full sample. Estimates for a sample restricted to households with three or fewer children are presented in Appendix Table A2 . 
The Effect of Family Size on Enrollment
Robustness
The main results show that eldest children with younger siblings are more likely to be enrolled in school than those without younger siblings. In this section, I
consider and provide evidence against the concern that the instrument affects the school enrollment of the first child through channels other than family size (i.e., the exclusion restriction is violated).
Family Composition
Using the triple difference as an instrument for family size requires that the instrument does not affect any right-hand-side variable other than family size. However, if the relaxation also changed the sex composition of children in families of the affected cohort, then the 2SLS estimate will be confounded. I can explore this possibility by estimating equation (4) for the sex of second and higher parity births. If the percentage of males born after the relaxation was introduced in 1982 is similar between regions that received the relaxation and those that did not, then one will be less concerned about a change in composition. The coefficients and standard errors for second born children are shown in Table 4 columns (3) and (4). For third and higher parity births, they are shown in columns (5) and (6). They and their 95% confidence intervals are plotted in Figures 5B-5C , which show that the One Child Policy and subsequent relaxations did not affect sex ratios of higher order births in relaxed counties relative to counties without relaxations. Thus, the relaxation did not affect the sex composition of children.
I discuss Figure 5A when I discuss selection.
Marriage Market
One possible concern for the empirical strategy is that the instrument affected enrollment through channels apart from family size. In particular, the results may This is inconsistent with the marriage market explanation. Figure 5A plot the coefficients for the correlation between sex of first parity births and whether a region obtained a relaxation for each birth cohort (the coefficients and standard errors are shown in Table 4 columns (1)- (2)). It shows that sex ratios are higher for first-born children in regions that received the relaxation in the years leading up to the relaxation. This is consistent with the fact that the relaxation was motivated by the desire to curb son-biased sex-selection. The implication that the relaxation was more likely to be implemented in regions where parents had stronger preferences for boys raises the concern that parents who choose to have girls are 
Selection
Mechanisms
A second child can increase school enrollment of the first child for several reasons. Here, I consider some of the most obvious hypotheses. First, there could be economies of scale in schooling costs. These could include costs related to textbooks, school fees, clothes or food for school. Unfortunately, the data does not allow me to examine these costs directly. However, under the assumption that economies are larger when children are of the same sex, I investigate this hypothesis by examining whether the benefit of an additional child is larger when the two children are of the same sex. I separately estimate the 2SLS effect of family size on a sample excluding those where the first two children are the same sex, and a sample excluding those where the first two children are of different sexes. 14 The estimates for the two samples are shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 . The positive main effects are driven by households where the children are of the same sex. This should be interpreted cautiously since sex can be endogenously chosen by parents. 15 Second, I explore the hypothesis that a second child increases school enrollment of the first through permanent income channels. In rural China, parents rely on children for income during old age. Therefore, an additional child can be seen as an increase to permanent income. This will lead to an increase in school enrollment if parents can borrow against children's future income. This seems unlikely to be true in rural China during the 1980s. However, to be cautious, I investigate this hypothesis under the assumption that parents expect sons to earn more than daughters. In this case, permanent income effects should cause the benefit of the second child to be larger when the second child is a boy. Hence, I divide the sample into those that do not have a younger sister and those that do not have a younger brother and examine whether the main effect differs by the sex of the younger child. The results are shown in Table 5 columns (3) and (4). They show that the effects are larger for those with a younger sister. This is inconsistent with the permanent income explanation. As with the previous set of results, these results should be interpreted cautiously since the sex of the younger sibling can be endogenously chosen by parents.
14 Approximately 24% of the sample has siblings of the same sex. 15 I also estimated the differential effect of family size across different age gaps between the first two children. The results showed that the benefits are larger when larger age gaps exist between children. Interpretation of this result is made difficult that age gaps can be a result of sex selection. Parents who want a son for a second child and who are constrained to have no more than two children will, on average, have further spacing between their children than parents who have weaker son preference or parents who have limited ability to sex select. If the ability to select is correlated with factors that also determine education,such as income, then the estimated interaction effect will reflect the influence of those factors.
Finally, I explore the possibility that having a second child increases the enrollment of the first by increasing the demand on cash income. This demand could arise for contemporaneous needs or for future needs such as tuition and fees for secondary education or costs associated with marriage. If income gains from increasing labor supply exceed schooling costs and parents are credit constrained, then to meet these needs, parents could send their eldest child to school and increase their labor in the labor market. This is a plausible explanation in rural areas where neighbors and relatives can offer assistance to take care of the youngest child. Unfortunately, the data does not allow a direct examination of childcare of the youngest child, schooling costs, or wages. However, I can examine this hypothesis with cruder measures by estimating the effect of a second child on mother's labor supply and school delay.
Using a restricted sample of individuals who are currently enrolled in school, I repeat the main estimation with school delay as the dependent variable. It is measured as the difference between an individual's years of education and the years of education he/she should have had assuming that he/she began at age seven. The means are shown in Appendix Table A1 columns (5)- (8) . Table 6 Panel A shows that, on average, first-born children of households with three and fewer children are 0.5 years ahead in schooling relative to the legal requirement. The sample means are similar for boys and girls. The OLS estimates in Panel A show that an additional sibling is correlated with being behind in school relative to the mean. But the estimates are not statistically significant. In contrast, the 2SLS estimates show that having a younger sibling causes the first child to attend school earlier. However, these estimates are also not statistically significant.
Next, I estimate the effect of having an additional child on mother's labor supply.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the mother does not work outside of the home. The results are presented in Table 7 . The estimates are negative and almost statistically significant at the 10% level. They suggest that an additional child causes the mother to be less likely to stay at home and more likely to participate in the labor market. Columns (7) and (8) show that the effect is statistically similar between those with a younger son and those with a younger daughter. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that parents view schools as an alternative source of child care for the first child and send her to school while the mother enters the labor force.
Conclusion
This paper estimates the effect of family size on school enrollment for first-born children. It resolves the problem of joint determination by exploiting the plausibly exogenous variation in family size caused by relaxations in the One Child policy. The results show that both the One Child Policy and the previous four-year birth spacing policy were well enforced; and that the 1-son-2-child relaxation increased family size for girls born in relaxed areas. Then, it uses the variation in family size caused by this relaxation to show evidence that a second child increased school enrollment of the first child. The empirical results provide empirical evidence for a novel insight about first born children, who have thus far been the focus of most existing empirical studies of quantity-quality. They show clearly that first born children benefit from having a younger sibling.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide conclusive evidence on the mechanisms driving the main effects. The empirical findings suggest that economies of scale in schooling and increased income demand from an additional child could play important roles. Interpreting these results outside of the context of rural China requires caution. This is especially true if parents in these other contexts do not have access to inexpensive public schooling or good labor market opportunities.
Appendix -Selection Correction
To correct for the selection of parents who may value girls and education in the relaxed regions, I remove the "extra" boys from relaxed counties and replace them with girls that I construct so that for each cohort, the sex ratio is equivalent between counties with some relaxation and counties without any relaxation. Only boys who are not enrolled in school are removed. Added girls are assumed to be enrolled in school. This increases the average enrollment rate for boys born 1979-1981 in counties with the relaxation, and decreases average enrollment rate for girls in counties with the relaxation. 2SLS using this "stacked" sample will be biased against finding a positive effect of family size on school enrollment and allow me to estimate the lower bounds of the positive family size effect and investigate the extent to which the main results are driven by selection.
To estimate the number of "extra" boys, I first need to examine the extent of sexselection in regions that received the relaxation before the relaxation was enacted.
Recall that Figure 5A plots the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. The estimates imply that 10.6 percentage-point more males were born in relaxed regions in the two years prior to the introduction of the relaxation. I use this difference to calculate the number of extra boys due to the One Child Policy. The estimates from the alternative sample are nearly identical to the results from using the uncorrected data. These estimates are not reported in the paper for brevity, and are available upon request. 
All regressions control for the full set of interaction terms and birth year and county fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Regressions in columns (5)-(6) include controls for relax*girl, relax*birthyear, girl*birthyear, girl, birthyear fixed effects and county fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at county level. Regressions include county and birthyear fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All regressions control for the full set of interaction terms and birth year and county fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
*Column (7) is restricted to the sample individuals who do not have a younger brother.
*Column (8) is restricted to the sample individuals who do not have a younger sister. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
*Column (8) is restricted to the sample individuals who do not have a younger sister. (1)- (4) include county and birth year fixed effects. Regressions in columns (5)-(6) include controls for relax*girl, relax*birthyear, girl*birthyear, girl, birthyear fixed effects and county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at county level.
